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SOME SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE IN THE LAST CENTURY
Albert J. Harnot
The following article by the Dean of the College of Law in the University of
Illinois is one of several "request" contributions which recognize and honor
Northwestern University on .the completion of her first century. We have pub-
lished in number one of the present volume of this Journal (May-June, 1951) a
brief review of the action of the late John Henry Wigmore, Dean of the North-
western University School of Law, and other members of the University, in calling
the Conference on Criminal Law and Criminology in 1909, in organizing and
promoting the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, and in launch-
ing this Journal. It is generally conceded that these events have had a profound
and enduring effect upon the development of Criminal Law and Criminology,
especially in the United Stdtes.
Dean Albert J. Harno, author of this article, teaches criminal law and criminal
procedure in the University of Illinois. He is joint author of a report: "The
Workings of the Indeterminate-Sentence Law and the Parole System in Illinois,"
author of "The Supreme Court in Felony Cases" in the Illinois Crime Survey, and
has published a casebook on criminal law and procedure (2nd edition, 1950).
He is past-President of the Association of American Law Schools and the Illinois
State Bar Association, and is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences,-EDIMR.
"All theories on the subject of punishment have more or less broken
down," observed Sir Henry Maine in 1864 in a speech before the
Council of the Governor General of India. "We are again," said he,
"at sea as to first principles."' This- was an apt description of the situ-
ation in Sir Henry's time. It is equally apropos today. We live, think
and act as prisoners of our environment. Now and then some reflective
mind stops to question and to appraise. At intervals someone rearranges
traditional procedures into a new pattern. But only on very rare occa-
sions does anyone plant a new idea that takes root and grows. We have
waited long for that idea in the criminal law.
While it is true that there have been no epochal events in the criminal
law during the last century, it must not be taken that this period has
been sterile of change. Procedural modifications, some of which rate
as reforms, have occurred frequently, and there have been jurisdictional
extensions. Traditional concepts have had interpretative expansions
which have carried ideological implications and changes. There have
-The writer received helpful suggestions from the following individuals: Alfred L.
Gausewitz, Milton D. Green, Jerome Hall, Livingston Hall, W. H. Hitchler, Pendleton
Howard, Hiram H. Lesar, Roy Moreland, Charles B. Nutting, Lester B. Orfield, Rollin M.
Perkins, E. W. Puttkammer, Louis B. Schwartz, J. W. C. Turner, John B. Waite and
Herbert Wechsler. He wishes to acknowledge substantial assistance from Burton R. Riss-
man, a recent graduate of the College of Law of the University of Illinois.
1. LIFE AND SPEECHES OF SIR HENRY MAINE, 125 (1892).
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been shifts in emphasis touching basic principles. The criminal law
today is less an abstraction than formerly, and more an instrumentality
for dealing with human beings and human problems. There are evi-
dences of more flexibility in it. There is less strict adherence to legal
formulas, more stress upon administration; less emphasis on rules of
law, more on human motivation 'and behavior; less deference to abso-
lutes, more willingness to accept the findings of research; less assurance
as to the infallibility of law, more humility and more emphasis on social
consequences. The writer has sought to single out some of these trends.
He is deeply sensitive to the fact that this is a subject on which judg-
ments may vary profoundly, and that it is one which requires much
more extensive analysis and description than can be given it within the
confines of a magazine article.
EVOLUTION OF THE Mens Rea
Deeply rooted in the history of the criminal law is the concept of
mens rea. An essential element of a crime lay in the intent with which
the act was done. Stephen contended that the maxim actus non facit
reum nisi mens sit rea was an unfortunate one since "there is no one such
state of mind." 2 Stephen's problem was one of nominalism. The mens
rea concept is a general one, and as such it has performed a salutary part
in the development of the criminal law. What Stephen, perhaps, did
not foresee was that his statement had a broader implication than that
toward which his criticism was directed. Under the impact of the evolv-
ing mores, the maxim has proved to be too sweeping. The mens rea
concept, while still a major factor in the establishment of criminal guilt,3
has, in the last century, undergone substantial modification.
A deeper insight into physiological and psychological factors with
respect to their bearing on human behavior has worked some change in
the meaning of mens rea. Traditional rules, even when both harsh and
unreasonable, have a tenacity about them. The common-law view as to
responsibility for acts committed while drunk still holds but some courts
are showing an awareness of the findings of experts in this field and are
seeking to soften the strictness of the common law.4 There is enlight-
ened discernment in dealing with behavior problems of children and
2. II STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 95 (1883).
3. "The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the prin-
ciples of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
500, 71 S. Ct 857, 862 (1951).
4. CROTHERS, Criminality From lcoholism, 4 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOL. 859 (1914);
Haggard and Jellinek, ALCOHOL EXPLORED (1942) ; J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIM-
INAL LAW, 427 (1947).
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mentally immature adults, and this has stimulated legislation, some of
major import; for example, the Juvenile Court Acts and the Youth Cor-
rection Authority Acts. Inquiry into motivation, too, is becoming a
factor of increasing significance. 5 This has been most evident in the ad-
ministration of the criminal law, into which there has been introduced a
liberal measure of individualization, particularly in the granting of pro-
bation and parole.6  Individualization in a limited sense can also be
exercised by the courts, under a wide discretion resting in them as to
some crimes, in the fixing of penalties.
The expression, "malice aforethought," while still in common usage
by the courts and in legislation, has been critically analyzed and, except
as to murder in the first degree where the words "deliberate and pre-
meditated malice" have significance, 7 has been found to mean no more
than intending wrongfully to do an act dangerous to life." This analysis
has also brought into relief a fallacy in the doctrine of "constructive"
crime, and has resulted in limiting its application. The doctrine had
bearing principally in homicide. If an accused killed another in the
course of the commission of any felony, he was guilty of murder, though
the killing was not intended. This raised an apparent discrepancy be-
tween legal and moral guilt. While there is today no clear consistency in
court decisions on this issue, the tendency is, in sustaining a murder
charge, to require an act known to be dangerous to life.'
The status of mens rea in criminal negligence is somewhat obscure.
The conception of negligence developed tardily in the law. It has had
its principal application in the law of torts, and criminal cases based on
negligence were, a century ago, comparatively rare. Now with the ad-
vent of the automobile and other dangerous instrumentalities, criminal
actions founded in negligence and involving charges of assault and bat-
tery, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, man-
slaughter, and even murder, are common. Criminal charges are being
employed to control and discourage the reckless use of these instru-
5., Rex v. Steane (1947) 1 All E. R. 813. And see particularly the comment on this case,
UNGER, Motive and Intent in Criminal Law, 14 SOL. 151 (1947).
6. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 163 (1947).
7. People v. Caruso, 246 N.Y. 437, 159 N.E. 390 (1927); Bullock v. U.S., 122 F.2d 213
(1941); WECHSLER AND MICHAEL, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REv.
701, 1261 (1937).
8. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 52-54 (1881); REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION
APPOINTED TO CONSIDER THE LAW RELATING TO INDICTABLE OFFENCES, 23-24 (1879) ; Turner
v. Com., 167 Ky. 365, 180 S.W. 768 (1915).
9. Some Points in the Law of Murder, 67 JusT. P. 519, 531 (1903) ; L. HALL, The Sub-
stanti' e Law of Crimes - 1887-1936, 50 HARV. L. Ray. 616, 642 (1937) ; Wellar v. People,
30 Mich. 16 (1874); People v. Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 144- N.E. 497 (1924); Reg. v.
Sern6, 16 Cox C.C. 311 (1887). Cf. reasoning in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard
(1920) App. Cas. 479, 12 A.L.R. 846.
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mentalities. Since mens rea was an essential element in crime, the courts
were forced into an extended process of rationalization to find it. Was
mere negligent conduct to be the equivalent of mens rea? What was to
be the standird of care? Was that standard the same in the criminal
law as in tort? The answer was that criminal negligence had to be
distinguished. It had to appear that the accused's act amounted to a
crime. 10 To sustain a criminal charge his conduct had to be culp-
able. 1  Holmes gave the answer that made sense. "An act causing
death," said he, "may be murder, manslaughter, or misadventure accord-
ing to the degree of danger attending it by common experience in the
circumstances known to the actor." If a man should kill another, he
went on to say, "by driving an automobile furiously into a crowd he
might be convicted of murder however little he expected the result. If
he did no more than drive negligently through a street he might get off
with manslaughter or less." The criterion in such cases "is to examine
whether common social duty would, under the circumstances, have sug-
gested a more circumspect conduct. ' 12
What merits emphasis is that the objectives in criminal law adminis-
tration are in a process of evolution, and that this is entailing a modifi-
cation in the meaning of mens rea. The trend is away from punishment
as an institution and toward punishment as a means to an end, as a means
of social protection. 13  This trend has had its most striking manifesta-
tion in the growth of strict-liability or public-welfare offenses. The
beginnings of this development were inconspicuous. Today it is having
a mighty impact on law administration. It is a doctrine which in various
areas of human activity subjects the individual to criminal penalties for
the doing of an act without regard to what his intent may have been.
Mistake of fact, though reasonable, is not a defense. The doctrine
does not have general application, but as to particular acts it baldly
announces "that he who shall do them shall do them at his peril and will
not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance."' 4
10. Rex v. Bateman, 19 Cr. App. R. 8 (1925).
11. People v. Angelo, 246 N.Y. 451, 159 N.E. 394 (1927).
12. Holmes in Com. v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 178, 52 Am. Rep. 264 (1884-), and in Nash
v. U.S., 229 U.S. 373, 377, 33 S.Ct. 780 (1912). This may be an over-simplification of what
is really a confusing subject. He who explores it will encounter in court decisions and
legislation a plethora of terms, e.g.: "negligence," "gross negligence," "culpable negligence,"
"reckless and wanton conduct," "reckless disregard of human life," and various others.
What do they mean? For criminal liability the term "recklessness" with a connotation of
moral culpability is preferable. In recklessness "the actor is conscious of a forbidden harm,
he realizes that his conduct increases the risk of its occurrence. It is thus a form of
intentional harm-doing in that it is volitional in a wrong direction." J. HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 217 (1947); MORELAND, A RATIONALE OF CRIMINAL NEG-
LIGENCE (1944).
13. SAYRE, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REv. 974, 1017 (1932).
14. Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 70, 30 S.Ct. 663 (1910).
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Before the middle of the last century the courts had adhered strictly
to the view, even in minor offenses, that no one was to be punished for
crime without proof of mens rea. A defection from that position oc-
curred in Regina v. Woodrow15 decided in England in 1846. In that
case a dealer was held liable to pay a penalty, imposed by a statute, for
having in his possession adulterated tobacco, although he had purchased
it as genuine and had had no knowledge or cause to suspect that it was
not genuine. A similar view was recognized in the United States in
1849 in Barnes v. State,'6 and apparently without awareness of the Eng-
lish decision. From these early cases this doctrine has spread to a wide
variety of areas. It is founded in statutory regulations that impose
penalties for the doing of acts which the statutes have prohibited, or for
a failure to perform duties which they have created. A characteristic
of these statutes is that they make no mention of mens rea as a requisite
to liability. With their enactment the courts were troubled over a
momentous question: Were these statutes to be enforced as directed
under a strict reading of their language, or was the element of mens rea
to be implied? The decisions on this issue have not been uniform, but
strict interpretation is gaining the day.'1
The application of this doctrine was, at first, confined to minor offenses
involving slight punitive sanctions. In the early stages of its develop-
ment it moved into the areas of buyer-seller relations: the sale of adult-
erated foods, of narcotics, intoxicating liquor, drugs, misbranded ar-
ticles, etc. 8 The rationale for it was persuasive. The seller was in a
better position to know the genuineness or the purity of the article sold
than the buyer; hence he must sell at his peril. But it was not confined to
these areas. A new and potent weapon for control had been discovered.
If it was an effective measure as to minor offenses and simple relations,
why not have it apply also to more serious crimes and more complex and
obscure legal situations ? It was resorted to in statutory rape cases and
other sex offenses' 9 and in the control of motor vehicle thefts. It moved
into areas of administrative law as an instrument for rent control and
price administration. 20  It was of no avail to an accused who ran afoul
15. 15 M. and W. 404- (1846). The development of this doctrine is traced in SAYRE,
Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1933).
16. 19 Conn. 398 (1849).
17. L. HALL, The Substantive Law of Crimes- 1887-1936, 50 HARV. L. REv. 616, 644-
645 (1937).
18. Discerning analyses of the import and scope of the doctrine can be found in SAYE,
Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLuM. L. REv. 55 (1933) and in J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL LAW, 279 (194-7).
19. Cf., PERKINS, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 35,
63-64 (1939).
20. Gilbert v. Thierry, 58 F. Supp. 235 (1944).
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of this doctrine that the actual violation of the statute was by another,
even though the accused was innocent of wrongdoing and the other in-
tentionally violated, so long as the accused was the principal in the trans-
action. 1 The rule and the raison d'etre for it is stated in a recent opin-
ion22 by Mr. Justice Frankfurter: "The offense is committed * * * by
all who do have such a responsible share in the furtherance of the trans-
action which the statute outlaws, namely, to put into the stream of inter-
state commerce adulterated or misbranded drugs. Hardship there
doubtless may be under a statute which thus penalizes the transaction
though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting. Balancing
relative hardships, Congress has preferred to place it upon those who
have at least the opportunity of informing themselves of the existence
of conditions imposed for the protection of consumers before sharing in
illicit commerce, rather than to throw the hazard on the innocent public
who are wholly helpless."
It is difficult to appraise the import of this development. That it is
having a significant impact on the social and legal context of our time
there can be no doubt. As to objectives, it is reasonably clear that the
stress of the movement is less on punishment for wrongdoing, and more
on social control and protection. It is a movement, typical of others in
our day, in which the public interests are in the ascendency over those of
the individual. For the individual it has grim forebodings. He is
reconciled to, if, indeed, he does not approve, the application of the doc-
trine to police and other minor regulations, but when employed in more
serious measures, it strikes him as arbitrary and unjust. In its wider
social implications the movement is tinged with capriciousness and ap-
pears not to have adequate brakes to stop it or to slow it down, unless,
perhaps, they are to be applied through the due process clause of the
Constitution. The development calls for an early and thorough evalua-
tion by our legislative bodies and the courts as to its impact upon human
integrity and welfare.
MENTAL DISEASE
The subject of mental disease or insanity does not, perhaps, qualify
as a topic for discussion under the title of this article. Many will agree,
if not insist, that there has been no significant development in this field
of the criminal law during the last century. The significant event was
in 1843 when the Lord Justices in M'Naghten's Case23 gave their an-
21. U.S. v. Parfait Powder Puff Co., Inc., 163 F.2d 1008 (1947).
22. U.S. v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284-285, 64 S.Ct. 134 (1943).
23. 10 Clark and Fin. 200 (1843).
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swers to the questions addressed to them by the House of Lords. The
famous rules they laid down in that case were not an innovation as is
sometimes thought. They were the issue of an evolution of thought and
expression on this subject by writers and judges of that time.24 A verdict
of not guilty on the ground of insanity had been rendered in a sensa-
tional murder case. The verdict having been made the subject of debate
in the House of Lords, it was resolved by that body to take the opinion
of the Judges on the law governing such cases. The rules or tests laid
down by the Judges in their opinion are a landmark in the criminal law.
They, and particularly the "right and wrong" test announced in that
case, have served as points of departure for discussions, and, indeed, for
explosive criticisms from the time that opinion was written to the present
day. Very rarely, if ever, has any rule of law been so extravagantly and
caustically censured as the "right and wrong" test of M'Naghten's Case.
The weight of the criticism has come from scientific experts25-psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists-but lawyers and judges too have stated their dis-
approval of these rules.26 Notwithstanding, the "right and wrong" test
of M'Naghten's Case has tenaciously withstood these onslaughts for
over a century. It is the test that the courts use today in instructing
juries in nearly all Anglo-American jurisdictions whenever the issue of
insanity is raised as a defense in a criminal case. A few of the United
States have added the irresistible impulse test.27
How has it been possible for these rules to survive? The criticisms
of them have substance. The rules are based on-what is now an unten-
able view that the brain is divisible into compartments. More enlightened
understanding of this subject takes the position that there is unity in the
mental process. If an individual's mind is in disorder, he no longer
thinks and acts as he formerly did; his motivations are changed and are
unpredictable; his desires, perceptions and volitions are altered; he is
a changed being. Delusions, hallucinations and "disorders of the im-
pulse or of the inhibitory function" are not the mental disease, but are
evidences of the disease.28 This conception of mental disorder should,
it would seem, have profound implications as to criminal responsibility.
24. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW, 161-162 (1925).
25. These criticisms are discussed in J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW,
477 (1947).
26. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577 (1886) ; State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
27. WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW, 15-16 (1933). New Hamp-
shire has rejected both the "right and wrong" and the irresistible impulse test.
28. GLuEcK, Psychiatry and the Criminal-Law, 14 VA. L. REV. 155, 175-177 (1928).




Why then have these rules, and particularly the "right and wrong" test,
been retained?
An attempt to answer this question must, of course, be a matter of
conjecture and as such it may be off the mark. The conservatism in-
herent in the evolution of the law has probably been a factor. The cir-
cumstances that gave rise to and the rendering of the opinion in the
M'Naghten Case may be another factor. This was no mere opinion in
a legal controversy. The rules were formulated by distinguished judges
in answer to questions submitted to them by the House of Lords. They
were a crystallization of the opinions of judges and writers of that day.
With a judicial landmark of so great authority and import to guide
them, it is not to be wondered that future generations of judges clung
to it as a precedent. Also, the "right and wrong" test, which is the focal
one of the rules, has a core of validity that has never been dispelled.
What may be a very cogent reason for the survival of the rules has its
root in the nature and totality of the criticisms directed at them. The
plain fact is that the scientific experts on this subject speak a discordant
language. They do not agree among themselves. Their words often are
vague and confusing. The processes of the law move slowly, but when
science has blazed a clear trail, enlightened judges will travel it, and
where they go, others will follow, hesitatingly and falteringly perhaps,
but follow they will. And so eventually the trail becomes a beaten path
of the law. But the law will not move in where the trail blazers are in
disagreement on the route to be followed.
But while M'Naghten's Case has withstood the storms of a century,
this field of the criminal law has not been wholly devoid of change.
Procedural measures have been established which alleviate to some
extent the irrational administration of the M'Naghten rules. These
measures include: (1) the appointment of impartial expert witnesses
by the court, (2) the commitment of the accused, when insanity is in
issue, to a hospital for observation, and (3) the Briggs Law type of
examination.
One of the objectionable features of a trial relates to practices in the
admission of expert testimony. Each litigant in a trial has the legal
privilege of calling his own witnesses. This is a precept of the law, and
one that is basic to a fair trial. But when hired experts are called by
each side, this procedure is often debased and resolves itself into a
battle of mercenaries. It is under clashes such as this that the issue of
insanity is often litigated. The situation calls for impartial experts.
Approximately twenty states have in recent years enacted salutary legis-
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lation authorizing the trial court to appoint experts.2 9 Illustrative of this
movement is Rule 28 of the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Under this rule the court may order the parties to show cause why
expert witnesses should not be appointed and may request the parties to
submit nominations. The court may appoint any witness agreed upon
by the parties, and it may appoint witnesses of its own selection. After
appointirg a witness, the court is directed, at a conference in which the
parties may participate, to inform him of his duties. The witness so
appointed is to advise the parties of his findings and he may thereafter
be called by the court or any party to testify. The parties may also call
expert witnesses of their own choosing.
A number of states have enacted statutes which authorize the court,
when insanity is in issue, to commit an accused to a state hospital for
observation. These statutes vary in language and in scope. In some
the accused may be committed for observation on the issue either of
insanity at the time of °the alleged criminal act, or at the time of the
trial; in others commitment may take place only when the issue relates
to the accused's mental capacity to stand trial.8 0 The New York
statute,1 for example, provides that when it shall appear that an accused
indicted for felony or misdemeanor, because of idiocy, imbecility or
insanity, is "incapable of understanding the charge * * * or of making
his-defense, or if the defendant makes a plea of insanity to the indict-
ment, instead of proceeding with the trial, the court, upon its own
motion, or that of the district attorney or the defendant, may in its
discretion order such defendant to be examined to determine the ques-
tion of his sanity." The examination in cases arising outside of New
York City are made by two qualified psychiatrists designated by the
superintendent of the hospital. In New York City the director of the
division of psychiatry designates the psychiatrists. Following the exami-
nation a report is made on whether or not the accused is at the time of
the examination capable of "understanding the charge .against him * * *
or of making his defense." This report is filed with the clerk of the
court. It is subject to inspection on order of the court, but is not re-
ceived in evidence at the trial.
The celebrated Briggs Law32 is broader in scope and implications!
29. WEIOFEN, Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases, 48 MIcH.
L. REv. 961, 963 (1950). There are numerous other good articles. An impetus to the-
movement of appointment of experts by the court was the Uniform Expert Testimony Act-
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
30. WEiHOFEN, supra, note 29, 965-971.
31. N. Y. Code of Crim. Proc. secs. 658, 659, 662 (1950).
32. Laws of Mass. c. 123, sec. 100A. For appraisals of the Briggs Law see OVERHOLSER,
The Briggs Law of Massachusetts: A Re'view and an Appraisal, 25 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMF-
NOL. 859 (1935) ; WEIHOFEN, supia, note 29, 971-974; GAULT, CRIMINOLOGY, 402 (1932).
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than the above. It projects a program of discovery. It provides that
whenever a person is indicted for a "capital offense or whenever a per-
son, who is known to have been indicted for any other offense more
than once or to have been previously convicted of a felony, is indicted
* * * or bound over for trial * * *, the clerk of the court * * * shall
give notice to" the State Department of Mental Diseases, "which shall
cause such person to be examined with a view to determine his mental
condition and the existence of any mental disease or defect which would
affect his criminal responsibility." The statute directs the department
to file a report of its investigation with the clerk of the court in which
the trial is to be held. This report is made accessible to the court, the
probation officer thereof, the prosecuting attorney and the attorney for
the accused. The aim of the statute, it is to be observed, is to set up a
routine of psychiatric examination. This law is, perhaps, the most sig-
nificant step yet undertaken toward setting up a working arrangement
between the criminal law and psychiatry.33
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS
The view was long held that a corporation could not commit a crime.
The situation posed was paradoxical. The corporation was a creature
of the law; it existed only by sufferance of law but the law, once having
established it, could not touch it on matters involving criminal responsi-
bility. This artificial being could perform many acts a natural person
could do, and some he was incapable of doing, but since it did not have
a mind it could not have the mens rea for crime. Said Lord Holt in
1701, "A corporation is not indictable, but the particular members of
it are. ' 34 As late as 1922 the English Court of Criminal Appeal held
that a corporation could not be "committed for trial. ' 3 5 But in 1944
the Court of Criminal Appeal held that an indictment for a common-
law conspiracy would lie against a corporation. The court took the
broad view, subject only to exceptions "arising from the limitations
which must inevitably attach to an artificial entity," that corporations
33. For other developments in the area of mental disease, see WEIHOFE'4 and OVER-
HOLSER, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Crime, 56 YALE L. J. 959 (1947);
WOODBRIDGE, Physical and Mental Infancy in the Criminal Laow, 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 426
(1939).
34. Anonymous, 12 Mod. 559, 88 Eng. Rep. R. 1518.
35. Rex v. Daily Mirror Newspapers (1922) 2 K.B. 530, 541. The point was a subtle
one. The company was indicted for corrupt practices. It was found guilty and fined. The
question turned on the expression "committed for trial" used in the Grand Juries (Sus-
pension) Act. The defense argued that a corporation could not be "committed for trial."
Counsel for the prosecution described this as an "attractive technicality." Lord Hewart,
while recognizing that the question raised was not one of substance, said: "It is nevertheless
a valid point of law." This was clarified by the Criminal Justice Act of 1948, which
authorized prosecution of corporations by indictment.
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are indictable for crime.36 In another English case, decided the same
year, the Court of Appeal held that a corporation could be indicted and
convicted of a crime which involved an intent to deceive.3 7
In the United States the evolution of the law on this subject parallels
that of England. Wholehearted acceptance of the view that corpora-
tions are fully amenable to criminal prosecution is, to be sure, a recent
development-so recent, indeed, that counsel are still raising the issue in
defense of their clients. It is perhaps surprising, in view of the promi-
nent place the corporation has occupied in the economic affairs of a
great industrial era, that this change has occurred without fanfare.
Be that as it may, the transition is very nearly universal, subject only
to occasional defections as to crimes requiring a showing of specific
intent.38
CONSPIRACY
The modern crime of conspiracy had its origin in the English court
of Star Chamber. It was a potent creation, and one that has been
viewed with apprehension from its beginning to thepresent day.3 9 Not
only did the Star Chamber fashion the crime; it gave the offense
vitality and injected into it an ominous element that ever since has
characterized it. The Star Chamber was a fitting agency for this enter-
prise. Hudson, a friendly critic, wrote of it that in the Star Chamber
"all offences may be here examined and punished, if it be the king's
pleasure,"40 and that "by the arm of sovereignty, [it] punisheth errors
creeping into the Commonwealth, which otherwise might prove danger-
ous and infectious diseases, or [it] giveth life to the execution of laws,
or the performance of such things as are necessary in the Common-
wealth, yea although no positive law or continued custom of common
36. Rex v. I. C. R. Haulage, Ld. (1944) 1 K.B. 551, 554. The court mentioned among
the exceptions, at p. 554: "perjury, an offence which cannot be vicariously committed,"
bigamy, and "offences of which murder is an example, where the only punishment the court
can impose is corporal, the basis on which this exception rests being that the court will not
stultify itself by embarking on a trial in which, if a verdict of Guilty is returned, no
effective order by way of sentence can be made."
37. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Kent and Sussex Contractors, Ld. (1944-) 1
K.B. 146.
38. This trend is particularly significant in view of the numerous federal statutes im-
posing criminal liability on corporations. Good discussons of the subject can be found in
the following: EDGERTON, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L. J. -827 (1927);
LEE, Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1928); W. 3. D., The Criminal
Responsibility of Corporations, 62 ScoT. L. REV. 212 (1946); New York Central R. R. v.
U.S., 212 U.S. 481, 29 S. Ct. 304 (1909) ; State v. Salisbury Ice and Fuel Co., 166 N.C. 366,
81 S.E. 737 (1914); People v. Canadian Fur Trappers' Corp., 248 N.Y. 159, 161 N.E. 455
(1928) ; Golden Guernsey Farms v. State, 223 Ind. 606, 63 N.E.2d 699 (1945).
39. I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 227-229 (1883) ; 8 HoLDs-
WORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 378-384 (1926) ; SAYRE, Criminal Conspiracy,. 35 HARV.
L. REV. 393 (1922) ; HARNO, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 624 (1941).




law giveth warrant to it. 1'41 In another passage he characterizes the
court as acting as the "curious eye of the state and king's council prying
into the inconveniencies and mischiefs which abound in the Common-
wealth." 42 It would appear that the modern crime of conspiracy is
proving itself worthy of its creator.
The principal development in this field in recent years has had to do
with the nebulous expansion of the crime through legislation and judicial
decisions, and the increasing resort to conspiracy charges on the part
of prosecutors and particularly by attorneys for the United States.
The growing dangers incident to conspiracy indictments were stressed
in 1925 by the Senior United States Circuit Judges in their recom-
mendations to the district judges. "We note," said they, "the preva-
lent use of conspiracy indictments for converting a joint misdemeanor
into a felony; and we express our conviction that both for this purpose
and for the purpose-or at least with the effect-of bringing in much
improper evidence, the conspiracy statute is being much abused." They
expressed concern over the general impression "that this method of
prosecution is used arbitrarily and harshly," and over the fact that the
"rules of evidence in conspiracy cases make them most difficult to
try without prejudice to an innocent defendant. ' 43 Directing his remarks
to another phase of the growing hazards for individuals accused of
criminal conspiracy, judge Learned Hand emphasized the fact that
''many prosecutors seek to sweep within the drag-net of conspiracy all
those who have been associated in any degree whatever with the main
offenders." That there are, he pointed out, "opportunities of great
oppression in such a doctrine is very plain, and it is only by circum-
scribing the scope of such all comprehensive indictments that they can
be avoided. ' 44 Notwithstanding these admonitions by respected senior
judges, the objectionable practices attendant upon conspiracy prosecu-
tions have not abated, but, indeed, have increased.
In the last decade much public attention has centered upon conspiracy
indictments in relation to anti-trust cases, war-crime trials, and the
use of these indictments as a device for reaching the members of dis-
loyal or subversive organizations. Public interest in cases of this sort
should not, however, divert attention from the pervasiveness of this
doctrine. Mr. Justice Jackson, in a very able concurring opinion in
Krulewitch v. United States,4 5 has marshalled the dangers and pitfalls
41. Id., 107.
42. Id., 126.
43. Rep. of the Atty. Gen. (1925) 5-6.
44. U. S. v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (1940).
45. 366 U. S. 440, 445, 69 S. Ct. 716 (1949).
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that lurk for the accused in a conspiracy case. He prefaced his opinion
by stating that the Krulewitch case, which involved a prosecution for
inducing a woman to go from one state to another for the purpose of
prostitution, "illustrates a present drift in the federal law of conspiracy
which warrants some further comment because it is characteristic of
the long evolution of that elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense. ' 46 He
traced its history to the crime fashioned by the court of Star Chamber.
"Conspiracy in federal law," he pointed out, "aggravates the degree of
crime" over that of the unconcerted offense; it fosters a doctrine which
"will incriminate persons on the fringe of offending." 47 A co-defendant
in a conspiracy trial "occupies an uneasy seat." There generally is
evidence of wrongdoing by someone but it is difficult for the co-defendant
"to make his own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors
who are ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked together. ' 48
There is a steady expansion in conspiracy trials of the doctrine under
which the acts and intentions of one person are imputed to another.
There seems to be no logical limit, Justice Jackson believes, "to the
'implied conspiracy,' either as to duration or means, * * * Conspira-
tors, long after the contemplated offense is complete, after perhaps
they have fallen out and become enemies, may still incriminate each
other by deliberately harmful, but unsworn declarations, or uninten-
tionally by casual conversations out of court."49
Another highly disturbing feature for an accused in. this elastic crime
relates to its venue. Under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
he has the right to trial "by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed." A conspiracy charge
eludes the confines of this Amendment. Its leverage lifts the limitation
of the Amendment "from the prosecution and reduces its protection
to a phantom, for the crime is considered so vagrant as to have been
committed in any district where any one of the conspirators did any
one of the acts, however innocent, intended to accomplish its object."50
It would seem that prosecution for criminal conspiracy, ever with
implications of evil for the individual from the time the ingredients
of the offense were brewed in the Star Chamber, is today a serious
threat to the liberty of the individual, and, by that token, a factor
unwholesome to the general welfare. Mr. Justice Jackson has ably
summarized the issues for us :51
46. Id., 336 U.S. 445.







There is, of course, strong temptation to relax rigid standards when it seems the
only way to sustain convictions of evildoers. But statutes authorize prosecution for
substantive crimes for most evil-doing without the dangers to the liberty of the
individual and the integrity of the judicial process that are inherent in conspiracy
charges. We should disapprove the doctrine of implied or constructive crime in its
entirety and in every manifestation. And I think there should be no straining to
uphold any conspiracy conviction where prosecution for the substantive offense is
adequate and the purpose served by adding the conspiracy charge seems chiefly to
get procedural advantages to ease the way to conviction. 52
IMPACT OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
The criminal law is the dominant factor in crime repression. The
assumption is that crime control is a question of law. This is an assump-
tion that should be re-evaluated. The why of criminal behavior is a
question of fact. The mission of the criminal law is to establish sanc-
tions. But law does not, or at least should not, operate in vacuo. It
should be grounded in fact, and the facts of crime are exceedingly
complex. They touch the etiology of crime; they involve the physio-
logical and mental make-up of the individual; his environment, etc.
These factors are all interrelated. If we are to know about crime we
must know about the totality of influences that make the criminal.
Hodgepodge, unorganized factors are useless. "Scientists strive to
organize their knowledge in interrelated general propositions, to which
no exceptions can be found. ' 53  Thus we may learn what made the
individual behave as he did. The next question is to find out what to
do about it. This involves the application of prophylactic measures
and this process must be as painstaking as the diagnosis. Here we may
encounter a need for legislation. But if legislation is indicated, there
first is the question, what is to be the nature of the legislation? What
legislative measures promise to be beneficial? This is a question of
policy. That factor having been established, the state (organized
society) should then and then only express itself authoritatively through
law. It should be the aim of the law, thus conceived in an understand-
ing of the facts, to enact measures for crime repression. The law is
an applied science. Its mission is to coordinate and sanction the forces
for social control. 54 An essential factor in this conception is that meas-
,ures designed for the control of human behavior through law must
be founded in research.
52. The following discussions are helpful: O'BRIAN, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Asso-
ciation, 61 HARV. L. REv. 592 (1948); The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group
Crime or Protection of Indizddual Defendants, 62 HARv. L. REV. 276 (1948).
53. SUTHERLAND, PINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY, 4th Ed., 3 (1947). Also, TAFT, CRLMI-
NOLOGY, 43-53 (1950).
54. RADZINOWICZ AND TURNER, THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF CRIMINAL SCIENCE, IN THE
MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAw, 12-15 (1945).
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The subject of scientific research is one that merits much more detailed
discussion than can be given to it in these pages, for research is the
great potential on which improvement in the criminal law and its
administration must be based. To be sure, much of the research in
this area up to now has been fumbling and inept, 55 but some that has
been done holds forth much promise of things to come. So much,
indeed, that the introduction of research on questions of criminal be-
havior can be rated as one of the major developments in this field in
recent years. Too, it can be said in defense of the clumsiness which
has characterized many of these research attempts that the scientific
approach to the study of the criminal is a comparatively new under-
taking. Beccaria published his famous little treatise on Crimes and
Punishments in 1764. This was not a work of research; it was per-
ceptive and reformative, and as such had a far-reaching influence.
Beccaria advocated the prevention of crime rather than punishment-
a wholesome- approach, the importance of which has not even to this
day been wholly realized. What was, perhaps, the first scientific ap-
proach to the study of criminal behavior was a pamphlet by Lombroso,
The Criminal in Relation to .Anthropological Jurisprudence and Psychia-
try, published in 1876.56 This pamphlet also marked the advent of the
Positivist school of thought in which Lombroso, Garafalo and Ferri
were the principal figures.
The encouraging fact today is that research on crime and criminal
behavior is beginning to produce reliable data. One bewildering factor
for the lawmaker persists. The researches of the scientists still dis-
close "a tendency to emphasize a particular approach or explanation.
Proponents of various theories of causation still too often insist that
the truth is to be found only in their "own special fields of study, and
that, ex hypothesi, researches made by those working in other disci-
plines can contribute very little to the understanding and manage-
ment of the crime problem."5 7 But this narrowness of attitude is tend-
ing to disappear. There is a widening appreciation on the part of the
researchers of the fact that each "discipline concerned with the explana-
tion of human behavior may be able to contribute knowledge that *is
valuable now or in the future," and a growing conviction that "debate
on the superiority of this or that discipline should be closed."58 And
well it should, for each of the respective disciplines is making contribu-
55. MICHAEL AND ADLER, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1933).
56. ABRAHAMSEN, CRIME AND THE HUMAN MIND, 5-6 (1944).
57. S. AND B. GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, 4 (1950).




tions. The period of greatest productivity has been during the last
thirty-five years. Beginning with Healy's pioneering work, The Indi-
vidual Delinquent, published in 1915, and continuing to Sheldon and
Eleanor Glueck's studies, Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency, published
in 1950, a wealth of facts and information has been placed at the dis-
posal of lawmakers and others charged with the planning of programs
of crime repression and control. 59 These materials are uncoordinated
but that is a task for those who must mold the policy of measures for
crime control. The significant observation is that the administration
of the criminal law has entered into an era of research.
CRIME SURVEYS
The 1920's are distinguished for the number of crime surveys that
were made during that period. These surveys are representative of the
way our society occasionally gives tangible expression to the gnawing
pains of the crime problem. Witness the recent Kefauver investigation.
Some of the surveys of the '20's were confined to cities; several were
state-wide; they culminated in a sweeping national survey by the
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, commonly
known as the "Wickersham Commission." The Cleveland Foundation,
in 1922, sponsored the first of these surveys. It was "a study of the
administration of criminal justice in the city of Cleveland. Detailed
examinations were made of the police administration, of the activities
of the courts, judges and prosecutors, of penal and correctional treat-
ment, of the relation of psychiatry and medicine to crime, of the bar
and its training, and of the relation of the press to crime." 60 It was
followed by "Crime and the Georgia Courts," in 1924; "Report of the
Minnesota Crime Commission," in 1926; "The Missouri Crime Sur-
vey," in 1926; "A Study of Crime in Memphis," in 1928; "The Illinois
Crime Survey," in 1929; "Report of the Crime Commission of the
State of New York," in 1929; "Preliminary Report of the Survey
of the Administration of Justice in Oregon," in 1931, and several
59. Typical of the studies published are: BONGER, CRIMINALITY AND ECONOMIC CON-
DITIONS (1916) ; BURGESS, The Study of the Delinquent as a Person, 28 AM. J. SOCIOL. 657
(1923) ; SHAw, DELINQUENCY AREAS (1929); S. AND E. GLUECK, FIVE HUNDRED CRIMINAL
CAREERS (1930); ALEXANDER AND STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC
(1931) ; ALEXANDER AND HEALY, ROOTS OF CRIME (1935); J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND
SOCIETY (1935); KARPMAN, THE INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL: STUDIES OF THE PSYCHOGENETICS OF
CRIME (1935) ; TAFT, Nationality and Crime, 1 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 724 (1936) ; SELLIN,
Culture Conflict and Crime, Social Science Research Council, Bull. 41 (1938); ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, Vol. V, PRISONS (1940) ; CLINARD, Rural Crim-
inal Offenders, 50 AM. J. SocloL. 38 (1944).
60. MORSE AND MOLEY, Crime Commissions as Aids in the Legal-Social Field, 145
ANNALS 68, 71 (1929).
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others. 6' The most extensive of them, from the point of view both of
scope and man hours of labor, was the report of the National Com-
mission. These were no small studies hurriedly dashed off; they were
serious undertakings. The report of the Illinois Crime Survey covers
over eleven hundred pages, and that of the National Commission fills
nearly a bookshelf.
These studies are not primarily works of research, although much
of the labor that went into them qualifies under that designation. They
are descriptive. They were "the first attempts to study and describe
the administration of the criminal law as a whole, that is, as a series of
integrated processes conducted by a number of related institutions, and
it is in this that their importance chiefly lies." 62 Each of the surveys
contains recommendations and advice, but they do not set up integrated
programs for action. On the whole their results are perhaps dis-
appointing. To some it must appear that a mountain was in labor and
brought forth a mouse. But this is not a fair appraisal. Their tangible
results, to be sure, are not many, but the conjectural ones are sub-
stantial. Prior to the surveys, "we knew much of what they have
revealed, but our knowledge often lacked precision. '63 Bettman lists
a substantial number of "major findings and recommendations" which
he has derived from his analysis of these studies.64 The surveys he
states, "have sown many seeds which have already taken root." 65 They
opened the eyes of the people to the complexity of the crime prob-
lem, and they provided researchers with excellent data which can be
used as starting points for further research. Also, they served the
salutary purpose of an emotional exhaust for public indignation over
the inept administration of the criminal law, and this, indeed, is a
function not to be underrated.
SUBSTANTIVE REFORMS
The last century was marked by the introduction of a number of
reforms touching criminal law administration and more specifically
touching the individualized treatment of the criminal. Several of these
reforms had their beginnings before the opening of the century, but
all came to fruition in that period. They involved probation, parole,
the indeterminate sentence laws, the habitual criminal statutes, public
61. BETTMAN, REPORT ON PROSECUTION, NAT'L COM. ON LAW OBS. AND ENF., No. 4, 48-49
(1931).
62. MICHAEL AND ADLER, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, 268 (1933).
63. MICHAEL AND ADLER, id., 314.




enemy acts, sexual psychopath laws, the juvenile court acts, the Borstal
system in England and extensive changes in penology in England, the
English dominions and the United States, the Youth Correction Au-
thority Act in the United States, and the English Criminal Justice Act.
Probation had its seeds in the common-law authority of the judges
to suspend sentence. Attention was centered on it as a means of treat-
ment for offenders through the work of John Augustus, a Boston
shoemaker, 66 who in 1841 became a volunteer probation officer, work-
ing with drunkards confined to the city's jail. Massachusetts passed the
first probation law in 1878. By 1940, forty-two states, "the District of
Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and the United States
Congress, had provided for the use of probation. * * * All states have
established some form of probation treatment or specialized procedures
for juvenile offenders.' 6 7
It is difficult to evaluate the impact of probation. Clearly, it is not
a cure-all for crime. A high standard of administration for it is
essential. In all probability it would have a greater potential as a
crime preventative if its administration were more adequate. The
theory of it is sound. Imprisonment should be avoided whenever that is
consonant with the public safety; probation makes that possible and,
while the offender retains his liberty, it offers an approach for special
care and individualized treatment.68
The theory and practices relating to parole are similar to those
governing probation, with this difference: Parole is granted by the
parole authority after the individual concerned has served part of his
sentence in a penal or reformatory institution, while in probation the
execution of sentence to confinement is suspended by the trial court.
Parole dates back to the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Early
parole had to do with good prison conduct which resulted in a shortened
sentence. Good-time allowances are still employed, principally as in-
centives to good prison behavior. 69 Conditional release probably was
first employed in Australia in 1790 under the British "ticket-of-leave"
system. The first parole law, as we know it today in its developed form,
was enacted in New York in 1869, in a law authorizing the Elmira Re-
formatory. Its provisions were extended to state prisons by Ohio in
66. CHUTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROBATION IN THE UNITED STATES, in GLUECK (Editor),
PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 225 (1933).
67. HALPERN, PROBATION, ENCYC. OF CRIMINOLOGY, 388, 389 (1949).
68. GLUECK, The Significance and Promise of Probation, in PROBATION AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, 3-20 (1933).
69. BRUCE, HARNO AND BURGESS, PAROLE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE, 35 (1928).
[Vol. 42
CRIMINA4L I-AV AND PROCEDURE
1884. Since then the development has been rapid. All states now have
parole laws.70
The indeterminate sentence in the penal system is complementary
to parole. Originally all penalties for crime were fixed. The inde-
terminate sentence is an innovation. Sutherland reminds us, however,
that as early as the Inquisition these sentences were used, "for criminals
were sometimes sentenced to prison 'for such time as seems expedient
to the Church.' "71 In the United States the indeterminate sentence
was written into the law authorizing the Elmira Reformatory in 1869.
In 1889 New York passed a general indeterminate sentence law. By
1937 indeterminate sentence acts of varying scope had been passed
in thirty-nine jurisdictions. In each of these jurisdictions the maximum
period of imprisonment under an indeterminate sentence is the maximum
term fixed by law for the offense. The minimum terms vary. Some juris-
dictions authorize the judge, and one the jury, to fix the minimum
and maximum terms within the limits prescribed for the offense. Others
have adopted a more desirable feature and have given the power to
parole boards to fix the period of imprisonment between the statutory
limits. 72 Indeterminate sentence laws apply only to some offenses, and
in some jurisdictions only to some classes of offenders.73 The whole
movement is quite irrational. A favorable estimate of it is that it
represents a trend toward greater administrative, control of releases.
No one can say in advance how long a prisoner should be'confined. The
decisive factor should be his fitness for release, and that can be deter-
mined only through a knowledge of the prisoner and scientific predic-
tion based on that knowledge.
The purpose back of the habitual criminal and the public enemy acts,
while it had a semblance of design for individualization, was quite
distinct from that which stimulated measures initiating probation, parole
and the indeterminate sentence. These acts for the most part were
projected in periods of public revulsion against crime and the criminal.
New York had a "second offense" statute as early as 1797, and Massa-
chusetts enacted a habitual criminal statute in 1817. By 1900 nine states
had passed similar statutes, and by 1920 seven more had enacted
statutes of that sort. The wave of habitual criminal statutes reached
its crest in the 1920's, after World War I, and as a result of the
pressure of the crime commissions' reports. The New York Baumes
70. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY, 4th Ed., 534-536 (1947) ; GIARDINI, Parole,
ENCYC. OF CRrMINOLOGY, 285 (1949).
71. Id., 516.
72. Indeterminate Sentence La'ws-The Adolescence of Peno-Correctional Legislation.
50 HARV. L. REv. 677 (1937).
73. SUTHERLAND, op cit., 517-518.
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Law of 1926 was highly publicized. This act made mandatory life
sentences for those who had been convicted of felony a third or fourth
time. In the 1930's the trend was the other way. Connecticut repealed
its law on this subject, and New York modified its law to make life
imprisonment discretionary.7 4
A wave of public enemy acts also reached its crest in the 1920's.
They were passed in an effort to reach gangsters and organized crime.
Association with known criminals was made a crime in New York;
Michigan sought to make bearing a reputation as a criminal a crime;
and New Jersey enacted a "Gangster Act" aimed at persons found
in the possession of machine guns, and at members of a gang, or at
persons who had been thrice convicted of being disorderly, or who had
formerly been convicted of crime. Most of these acts were invalidated
by the courts.7"
The sexual psychopath laws are of recent origin. They are a 'product
of a growing understanding of the fact that sex offenders, although
they may be legally sane, may, nevertheless, require special treatment.
On the other hand, legislation may have been stimulated, as some be-
lieve, by a wave of public hysteria incited by irresponsible journalism. 76
Michigan enacted a sex offender law in 1937, which was declared uncon-
stitutional. A valid act was passed in Illinois in 1938. Similar laws
have been adopted in California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Ohio and Wisconsin. These laws were drawn to emphasize the civil
nature of the proceedings, and to avoid the implications of criminal
actions. The procedures under them are comparatively simple. They
provide that when a person charged with an offense is suspected of
being a sexual psychopath by an officer designated in the law,77 the' court,
on representations made to it, may appoint two qualified psychiatrists
to examine the offender. The examination is to determine whether the
person is a criminal sexual psychopath. A report is filed with the court
by the psychiatrists. This is followed by a hearing, which is held before
trial on the criminal offense. If at this hearing it is found that the
person is a criminal sexual psychopath, he is committed to an institu-
tion until cured. By the end of 1950 approximately one-third of the
74. BROWN, The Treatment of the Recidivist in the United States, 23 CAN. B. REv.
640 (1945); SUTHERLAND, op. cit., 531.
75. BROWN, op. Cit.
76. SUTHERLAND, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOL. 543 (1950).
77. The official may be the state's attorney (Illinois), the attorney general (Illinois,
Michigan), the district attorney (Massachusetts, Minnesota, Wisconsin), county attorney
(Michigan), or the court (Ohio). In California any person may initiate proceedings.
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states had enacted legislation for the detention and treatment of sex
offenders or aggressive sexual deviates.78
The common-law methods of dealing with children were harsh and
extremely harmful.79 A child under seven was incapable of having the
mens rea for crime; between seven and fourteen there was a presump-
tion that it was incapable of crime; otherwise, the child offender was
given the same treatment, under the law, as an adult. It was not
until near the middle of the nineteenth century that the public con-
science began to bestir itself over this problem. 0 In 1870 Massachu-
setts passed a law requiring separate hearings for children in Suffolk
County. In 1892 New York made provision for separate trials, dockets,
and records for children under sixteen. Rhode Island set up a -similar
requirement in 1898. In 1899 Illinois passed the first Juvenile Court
Act.8' The Illinois Act at once became a model for similar laws in
other states. By 1904 juvenile court acts had been passed in twelve
states, by 1912 there were twenty-two, and in 1945 all states had
enacted this legislation. 2 While the juvenile court is substantially an
American institution, attention was given to it, during the period of
legislative activity on this subject in the United States, through legisla-
tion in various other countries-in England, Switzerland, Canada, and
Australia. 83
Opinions vary on the import of the juvenile court movement. One
writer intimates that many of the changes have had little significance.
Because of the necessity of preserving the juvenile's constitutional rights
in the course of a hearing, he is of the opinion that most of the
"alleged and apparent differences" in procedure "are merely super-
ficial ones," and that the "changed nomenclature of the juvenile court
represents no very significant departure from older methods."8 14  He
recognizes, however, that there have been improvements, the extent
and degree of which depend heavily on the attitude and enlightenment
78. Sex Offenders-Civil Commitment for Psychiatric Treatment, 39 COLUM. L. REV.
534 (1939); The Legal Disposition of the Sexual Psychopath, 96 U. OF PA. L. REV. 872
(1948). A recent informative study on this subject is, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S STUDY
COMMISSION ON THE DEVIATED CRIMINAL SEX OFFENDER, State of Michigan (1951). "Illinois
has two types of sex offender laws, a 1938 law providing special commitment proceedings
in the case of individuals charged with a sex offense under the criminal law and a 1947
law applying to persons convicted of certain sex offenses, which permits their detention
for further treatment upon expiration of their regular sentence." COMMITMENT AND
RELEASE OF SEXUAL DEVIATES, Report prepared by Illinois Legislative Council, Pub. 103,
2 (1951). This is an excellent report.
79. EUGENE SMITH, Criminal Law in the United States, in PRISON REFORM AND CRIMINAL
LAW (Russ. Sage Found.), 77-78 (1910).
80. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 14 (1927).
81. TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, 172 (1949).
82. TAPPAN, op. Cit.
83. Lou, op. cit.
84. TAPPAN, op. cit., 178-180.
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of the respective judges who hear the cases. There is, of course, merit
in this appraisement. Lou's appraisal is broader in perspective and
is eminently fair.8 5 The juvenile court, he believes, "is conspicuously
a response to the modern spirit of social justice. It is perhaps," he
goes on to say, "the first legal tribunal where law and science, especially
the science of medicine and those sciences which deal with human
behavior, such as biology, sociology, and psychology, work side by side.
It recognizes the fact that the law unaided is incompetent to decide
what is adequate treatment of delinquency and crime. It undertakes
to define and readjust social situations without the sentiment of preju-
dice. Its approach to the problem which the child presents is scientific,
objective, and dispassionate. The methods which it uses are those of
social case work, in which every child is studied and treated as an
individual."
The juvenile court development became the precedent for other
movements. It soon was apparent that there was a class of offenders,
too old for the juvenile courts, who also required treatment separate
from that of the adult criminal. In response to this deepening discern-
ment, England established in 1908 the famous Borstal system designed
for offenders between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one.8 6 The Borstal
system is a "highly individualized form of institutional training and
treatment followed by a closely supervised period of parole. ' 8 7  It
now embraces thirteen institutions. "Some are Walled. Others are com-
pletely open. Each institution has its own particular specialty. 88s This
system deserves much more than cursory mention. It represents in-
dividualized treatment and care at its best. It is indicative of what can
be accomplished through insight into the problems of youth and through
enlightened and painstaking administration. By February 1, 1936,
13,294 individuals had graduated from Borstal training. From a "total
English male prison population of 8,464, only 688, or 8.1 percent, of
ex-Borstal lads were serving sentences of imprisonment, penal servitude,
or preventative detention. By 1942, over 15,000 men in England,
most of them married and owning their homes, had passed through
a Borstal institution." 8 9
In the United States the first substantial plan aimed to deal with
85. Op. cit., 2.
86. In 1936 the upper age limit was raised to twenty-three. Juvenile courts were
established in England in 1908 by the Children Act. The Borstal system was established
by the Prevention of Crime Act: RADZINOWICZ, Present Trends of English Criminal Policy,
in THE MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAW, 27, 30 (1945).
87. HEALY AND ALPER, CRIMINAL YOUTH AND THE BoRsTAL SYSTEM, 57 (1941).
88. PHILLIPS, The Federal Youth Corrections Act, 15 FED. PROB. 3, 9 (March, 1951).
89. PHILLIPS, id., 10; FRY, The Borstal System, in PENAL REFORM IN ENGLAND, ENG.
STUDIES IN CRIMINAL SCIENCE, Vol. I (1946).
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youth offenders in this age group was drafted by a committee of the
American Law Institute. A model bill bearing the title, "Youth Cor-
rection Authority Act," was approved by the Institute ifi 1940.90 The
Act sets up a Youth Correction Authority, an administrative agency.
It provides that the court, subject to some exceptions, shall commit
to the Authority all persons under the age of twenty-one who have been
convicted of crime. This Act, with some modifications, was enacted
in California in 1941, in Wisconsin and Michigan in 1947, in Massa-
chusetts in 1948, and by the Congress in 1950.
The Federal Youth Corrections Act was approved after ten years
of work on it by the Judicial Conference of the United States. It
creates, in the Department of Justice,, a Board of Parole, and within
that Board, a Youth Correction Division. The important features of
the plan, as described by Judge Phillips,9' are "integration of cor-
rectional measures under a single body, segregation of youth offenders
from adult offenders and segregation of classes of youth offenders,
power to develop variety of treatment facilities, flexibility of operations
in adapting particular forms of treatment to individual youths in' accord-
ance with their favorable or unfavorable responses, adequate super-
vision during conditional release, and focusing of effort on the important
youth crime problem."
Prison administration is in a period of transition. In the United
States there still are many prisons that are extremely backward. On
'the other hand, there are some that are being administered in accord
with most advanced principles. Modern theory in penology stresses
the rehabilitation of the prisoner through individualized and special
treatment. The English Borstal institutions and, in the United States,
those that are set up under the Youth Correction Authority Acts are
examples of the most progressive types. The trend is toward specializa-
tion with emphasis on educational and work programs for the prisoners.
Changes are being made in prison architecture from gloomy-walled
enclosures to cottage-type structures for some of the inmates. Stress
in administration is placed on a core of trained workers who have
tenure in their positions. Prisoners are classified according to type in
an effort to prevent one type from having harmful effects on another.
Clinard points out that, "The development of classification is probably
the most significant recent trend in prison work." In prison systems
90. ULMAN, The Youth Correction Authority Act, YEARBOOK, NAT'L PROB. ASS'N, 227
(194-1); SELLIN, THE CRIMINALITY OF YOUTH (1940).
91. The Federal Youth Corrections Act, 15 FED. PRoB. 3, 6 (March 1951). Judge
Phillips was a member of the committee on Punishment for Crime of the Judicial Con-
ference and chairman of a subcommittee that made the studies for and reported on this act.
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complying with advanced practices, "Classification of prisoners, accord-
ing to detailed sociological, psychiatric, psychological, educational, and
medical examinations, has become a recognized part"'92 of prison rou-
tine. In America classification of individuals and by institution has
reached a high development in the federal prison system.93
In England the forward-looking plan projected through the recent
Criminal Justice Act deserves mention. Reforms in penology both in
England and in the United States have been striking. In our impatience
with current shortcomings, we must not lose sight of the progress that
has been made. In identifying the principles that have governed these
developments during the last century, Radzinowicz makes a discern-
ing appraisement. As he views the situation, the following two principles
emerge:
(a) The system of punishment cannot be based exclusively on the nature of the
crimes committed, but must also be conditioned by the personality of the offenders.
The same kind of crime may be committed by entirely different types of criminals.
Punishment must therefore be suited to different categories of criminals.
(b) Punishment must not only be a reaction against the crime itself, but must also
aim at preventing the offender from committing further crimes. It is therefore
obvious, that if in certain cases the traditional punishment does not fulfil this latter
function, it must be replaced by some other measure.94
PROCEDURAL REFORMS
A number of changes, most of them in the last half-century, have been
introduced which have tended to liberalize the formal and artificial
criminal procedures of the common law. Some of the more significant
of these involve: a marked decline in the role of the grand jury; a
trend toward the simplification of indictments; the advent of and
recourse to waiver of jury; the simplification, in some jurisdictions, of
appeals and the broadening of the issues reviewable on appeal; the
creation of the office of public defender; and, in a wider coverage, in
part through legislation, in part through rules of court, revision and
systemization of the whole field of criminal procedure through com-
prehensive undertakings such as the American Law Institute's Code of
Criminal Procedure and the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The grand jury, long a protective institution for the accused and a
symbol of Anglo-American justice, has, with the evolutionary changes
92. CLINARD, Prison Systems, ENcYc. OF CRIMINOLOGY, 369, 381 (1949).
93. CLINARD, id., 375; RADZINOWIcZ, English Prison System, in THE MODERN APPROACH
TO CRIMINAL LAW, 123 (1945); CRAVEN, The Trend of Criminal Legislation, in PENAL
REFORM IN ENGLAND, 18 (1946); WEIHOFEW AND OVERHOLSER, Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 24 TEx. L. REV. 307 (1946) ; MORRIS, Penal Reform, ENcYc. OF CRIMINOLOGY, 290 (1949).
94. Present Trends of English Criminal Policy, in THE MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL
LAw, 27, 29-30 (1945).
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of the passing years, become a cumbersome, and for most purposes an
unnecessary, bit of. machinery. It was abolished in England in 1933.
It is on the decline in the United States, but here we have a complex
situation. Under constitutional provisions in a number of states, indict-
ment by a grand jury is required. In a few states constitutional pro-
visions retain the grand jury but provide that it may be abolished by
legislative action. A substantial number of states have eliminated the
grand jury as a requirement and have made permissive prosecution
by information in place of indictment. The statutes that have abolished
the grand jury commonly have a provision for its retention for special
situations. - Under the Constitution of the United States, "No person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." Some states
have similar constitutional provisions. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure95 require indictment by a grand jury when the offense "may
be punished by death," but permit waiver of indictment and prosecu-
tion by information for "an offense which may be punished by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year or at hard labor."
96
What are the factors that are effecting the decline of the grand jury?
Over the years other safeguards have been created and these have
caused its recession as a protective institution. What is perhaps the
most important of these has been the introduction of a new procedure-
the preliminary examination. The preliminary examination affords, at
least potentially, a greater protection for the accused than the grand
jury. Also, from the point of view of law enforcement, the preliminary
examination is less expensive than the grand jury and much more expedi-
tious. Even so, the grand jury has positive merits that must not be
ignored. What is called for is a readjustment of its functions, not its
complete elimination. The grand jury should be retained, as it has been
in some jurisdictions, for special assignments. As an investigatory body
searching into matters of public corruption and immorality, its per-
formances are unexcelled.9 7
A movement to simplify indictments became discernible seventy years
95. Rule 7 (a), 7 (b).
96. Much has been written about the grand jury. The following discussions are helpful:
1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW, 321 (1922); MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION, 134 (1929); MORSE, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REV.
101 (1931) ; NAT'L COM. ON LAW OBS. AND ENF., REPORT ON PROSECUTION, No. 4, 34 (1931) ;
DESSION AND COHEN, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YALE L. J. 687
(1932) ; WARNER AND CABOT, Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice during
the Past Fifty Years, 50 HARv. L. REv. 583 (1937) ; Elliff, Notes on the 4bolition of the
Grand Jury in England, 29 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOL. 3 (1938); ORFIELD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL, 135 (1947).
97. ORFIELD, id., 191; Reform in Criminal Procedure, 50 YALE L. J. 107 (1940).
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ago. New York passed a statute in 1881 providing that an indictment
should contain only "a plain and concise statement of the act con-
stituting the crime." ' 8 The same year Texas adopted its "Common
Sense Indictment Act."99 Massachusetts enacted a statute on this sub-
ject in 1899. The English Indictments Act of 1915 provided that an
indictment is sufficient which states "with reasonable clearness" the cir-
cumstances of the offense. 00 Most states now have similar statutory
provisions. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state, "The
indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and definite writ-
ten statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged."101
Procedures on amending informations are now fairly liberal, but amend-
ments as to substance of indictments are not permitted since indictments
must originate with the grand jury. For the clarification of indictments
and to obtain additional facts, defense attorneys may now move for
bills of particulars. The Federal Rules provide: "The court for cause
may direct the filing of a bill of particulars."'01 2 It must not be taken,
however, that criminal pleadings are entirely simplified. Courts often
still cling to old procedures. What is clear' is that the general trend
in criminal procedure is away from the cabala of the common law.
The jury has been the object of criticism for many years and various
procedural changes have centered on it. The principal criticisms have
involved the capriciousness of jury verdicts and the delays and expense
incident to jury trials. Some reforms relating to the jury were intro-
duced by statute in England as early as 1847. This statute permitted
waiver of jury in some juvenile cases. The scope of this act was grad-
ually extended by subsequent legislation until trial by jury in criminal
cases has almost disappeared in England. In 1926 approximately ninety
percent of the defendants charged with indictable offenses were dealt
with in courts of summary jurisdiction. 0 3
In the United States such far-reaching changes have been impossible,
if for no other reason, because of constitutional restrictions. There has,
however, been an increasing extension of waiver of jury trials. Waiver
of jury has been common in Maryland for many years. One writer
states it has been permitted in that state for over two hundred years.' 04
This practice has also been followed for some time in Connecticut and
98. N. Y. Code of Crim. Proc., §275.
99. JOHNSON, Waiver of Indictment in Texas, 1 TEx. LAW AND LEcIs. 22, 25 (1947).
100. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL, 202 (1947).
101. Rule 7 (c).
102. Rule 7 (f).
103. HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND, 307-310 (1931).
104. HANDLEY, Some Observations on Wraiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 1 TEx.
LAW AND LEGIS. 45 (1947).
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West Virginia. Until 1930 the federal courts had construed the con-
stitutional provision on trial by jury as a mandatory requirement for a
jury in indictable offenses. That year the Supreme Court, in Patton v.
United States 05 held that an accused in the exercise of free and intelli-
gent thoice and with the approval of the court may waive trial by jury.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now provide: "Cases required
to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury
trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the
government."'01 6 The Patton decision gave a marked impetus to waiver
of jury trials throughout the country. The practice varies from state to
state. For instance, "in 1934 in the courts of general jurisdiction in
Connecticut, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, there were more trials to the
court than before a jury; in Wisconsin, seven times as many. But in
Ohio jury trials were more numerous, and in California and Michigan
they were twice, and in Pennsylvania four times as common as trials to
the court.'1 0 7
While some misgivings have been expressed over the fact that the
"criminal jury is smoldering to extinction,"' 0 there can be little doubt
that this trend is a salutary one. It has resulted "in speedier, cheaper,
and more efficient trials and the elimination of unwholesome publicity
in certain classes of cases."' 0 9
Review of the judgments and sentences of the trial courts in criminal
cases was, under the common law, extremely restricted., There was no
appeal, properly so called. The trial judge could "reserve" a question
for consideration by the whole body of judges. Writ of error was a
matter of discretion and was for errors of law only. It was not until
1907 that an act was passed in England giving an effective right of
appeal from conviction and sentence to a specially constituted Court
of Criminal Appeal. An appeal can now be taken, under the English
system, "by a simple notice, and without cost. The Court has amply
justified its existence.""' 0 The appeal is on the whole case. In the United
States the question of review is in a stage of transition. On the whole,
the situation is quite unsatisfactory, and there is urgent need in most
states for a broadening and simplification of review procedures. A
number of states permit a review of the evidence to ascertain whether
105. 281 U.S. 276, 50 S.Ct. 253 (1930).
106. Rule 23 (a).
107. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL, 391 (1947).
108. Quoted in HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND, 310 (1931).
109. ORFIELD, id., 361; HOWARD, id., 319; BETTMAN, REPORT ON PROSECUTION, NAT'L COM.
ON LAW OBS. AND ENF., No. 4, 127 (1931) ; LIECK, The Administration of Criminal Justice,
in PENAL REFORM IN ENGLAND, 33, 58 (1946).
110. LIECK, id., 53.
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it is sufficient to support the indictment or information and the verdict.
Some follow a procedure of review upon exceptions."' The new federal
rules are an example of the best practices in this country. "Petitions
for allowance of appeal, citations and assignments of error" are
abolished. The notice of appeal requires only the specification of some
simple facts, the title of the case, the name and address of the
appellant and his attorney, a concise statement of the offense, of the
judgment or order and of the sentence imposed, a statement of the
place of confinement if the defendant is in custody, "and a statement
that the appellant appeals from the judgment or order.'- 1 2
Indigent defendants who are without legal assistance are assigned
counsel by the court. This is the practice that prevails generally through-
out the United States. A public defender system, of a sort, had existed
in a number of countries for some years, but it was not until 1914 that
an office of public defender was created in America, in Los Angeles,
California. Almost immediately it was carrying on a thriving business.
The movement soon spread to other areas. Nebraska adopted a law in
1915 authorizing a public defender for cities of 150,000 or more. A
more satisfactory program was set up in Connecticut. It covers the
state and leaves to the counties no option to approve or reject the
plan, as did the California act."13 Since then this movement has spread
to other states, but its coverage is still very limited. It is a develop-
ment aimed to provide equal justice for the poor and is in accord with
the public spirit of our times. One of its supporters has made this
brief but good appraisal of it: "The public defender plan is a pro-
gressive, logical adjunct to modernized criminal law administration.
Emphasis thrown on prosecution should not be to the prejudice of the
defendant without money. Through public defenders, many of the
scandals of private defense will be abolished. Equal justice must come
by law-not by favor or charity or by volunteer unpaid counsel, having
no definite duty or responsibility to defend. '""14
LEGISLATION AND MOVES TO CODIFY
The American public has a naive faith in the efficacy of legislation.
During the last half-century, the tide of- legislation creating new stat-
utory offenses and working procedural changes has been on the in-
111. NAT'L COM. ON LAW OBS. AND ENF., REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, No. 8, 18(1931).
112. Rule 37 (a).
113. PoTTS, Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: Legal 4id or Public Defender, 28
TEx. L. REv. 491, 510-513 (1950).
114. GOLDMAN, Public Defenders in Criminal Cases, 205 ANNALS 16, 22 (1939). NA'L
CoM. ON LAW OBS. AND ENF., REPORT ON PROSECUTION, No. 4, 32-33 (1931).
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crease. 1 5 The pressure upon the legislatures for the enactment of
criminal statutes has been phenomenal. "A welter of special interests,
specific abuses, publicized evils, and vague policies have dictated" the
direction of this legislation. "One result of this has been to make
everyone a criminal. * * * Such an indiscriminate use of the criminal law
weakens its hold as the arbiter of respectable conduct."' 16 The general
picture is one of patchwork and confusion. It must not be taken, how-
ever, that all this legislation has been haphazard. Some has been highly
constructive. Witness the English Criminal Justice Act of 1948, the
American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure, 117 the juvenile
court acts, the various uniform acts aimed to bring law and order to the
no-man's land between the jurisdictions of the separate states, and,
through rules of court,' the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
Criminal Justice Act is "one of the great penological statutes of the
century."118
In the offing is codification. Codification has been accomplished in
all the leading continental'countries of Europe, in some of the British
colonies, in India,-" and, in 1950, the Philippines. Major attempts
to codify the criminal law in England and the United States have been
abortive. We have what are called criminal codes in this country, but
most of these are no more than a compilation of statutory law on that
subject. The penal codes of California and New York are examples of
the more complete type of compilation. 20 The so-called Criminal
Code of Illinois is an example of the more fragmentary type. The
major efforts to codify the criminal law in this country and in England
were the Livingston Code, proposed for adoption in Louisiana in
1824,21 and the Criminal Code Bill, commonly called the Draft Ciimi-
nal Code of the Royal Commissioners, first introduced in England in
1878. The English Code Bill was drafted by Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen. Both of these draft codes were exceptionally able executions,
but both failed adoption.
In 1837 a commission proposed a code in Massachusetts but it, too,
was not adopted. In 1865 a commission in New York submitted a
115. DEAN, Organized Crime and Our Changing Criminal Law, 37 Com. L. J. 379 (1932).
116. L. HALL, The Substantive Law of Crimes-1887-1936, 50 HARY. L. REv. 616, 622-623
(1937); LINDSEY, Legislation on Crime in Twenty-Five Years, 24 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOL.,
109 (1933) ; BAKER, Legislative Crimes, 23 MINN. L. REV. 135 (1939).
117. The Institute has recently submitted this Code to the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for study and revision.
118. Magistrates' Notebook, 15 Sol; 205 (1948).
119. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 620-621 (15th ed. 1947).
120. DESSION, CRIMINAL LAW, ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER, 393-394 (1948).
121. "There are some works and deeds which echo and reverberate from generation
to generation and from age to age. Such is the work of Edward Livingston." MOORE, The
Livingston Code, 19 J. CRrM. L. AND CRIMINOL. 344, 357 (1928).
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draft code, the Field Code. This was at once adopted in the Dakota
Territory, and in New York in 1881 "substantially in its original
form. ' 12 2 In the 1930's a draft code was submitted to the Illinois
Legislature, but was not adopted. 23 Louisiana enacted a new Code
in 1942.124 A draft code was submitted to the 1951 session of the
Wisconsin Legislature but failed adoption. The 1950 Code of Crimes
of the Philippines, from the point of view both of draftsmanship and
its basic philosophy, has promise of rating as a major accomplishment. 2 5
There are many indications that we are at the beginning of a period
of revision and systemization of statutes and of codification, not only
of the criminal law but of law generally. A number of states now have
revisors of statutes, code commissions, and legislative councils or equiva-
lent agencies. There is a clear public reaction against the plethora of
laws. The risks of codification are real. The danger is that we shall
freeze the status quo, and much is yet to be learned about human
behavior. But reasons for codification also are real and they are urgent.
Anglo-American criminal law has nowhere in it evidence of plan or
design. That is its outstanding weakness. A great mass of judge-made
law containing a mingling of ancient precedents, outgrown formulas,
traditional beliefs, and some forward-looking expressions, supplemented
by a large number of statutory provisions, constitutes the framework
of the criminal law. A unity of aim is needed, and codification, when
it comes, should be erected on that foundation. The emphasis in the
criminal law still is on punishment for the deed. That should not be the
main end. There are many factors to be considered, among them the
individual and the public security. Punishment should be viewed as a
procedure subordinate to social ends, and should be appraised along
with other factors as to its effectiveness as an instrument for crime
repression and control.
EXPANSION OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Federal jurisdiction over crime has been steadily expanding ever
since the founding of our national government. The expansion has been
most marked in the last half-century. Under the Constitution the federal
government has restricted direct criminal jurisdiction, and in the early
122. DESSION, op. cit.
123. HARNO, The Plan of the Criminal Code, 24- ILL. B. J. 144 (1936).
124. MoRROw, The Proposed Louisiana Criminal Code-An Opportunity and a Challenge,
15 TUL. L. REv. 415 (1941); MoRRow, The Louisiana Criminal Code of 1912, 17 TUL. L.
REV. 1 (1942); SMITH, The Louisiana Criminal Code, 5 LA. L. REv. 1 (1942).
125. "In its fundamental part (Book I), the draft leans toward the positivist school,
which considers the man rather than the act itself." CODE OF CRrMES (Philippines), Pre-
pared and Submitted by the Code Commission, 111 (1950).
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period of the country federal criminal statutes were limited and simple.
They bore the "imprint of the controversies or conditions of the
time.' 1 26  They were designed to punish those who interfered with
the governmental processes, and were limited principally to crimes of
treason, piracy, counterfeiting, perjury in the federal courts, bribery
of federal officials, and to those common-law crimes which occurred
in territory over which the federal government had exclusive juris-
diction. That the federal government moved cautiously at first into
the domain of the criminal law was in no small part owing to the widely
held suspicion that the new government had designs to increase the
powers of the central government at the expense of those reserved
to the states. In the delicately poised federal system under which our
affairs of government, federal and state, are carried on, the problem
of balance of power is a constant and major concern. In the early
history this acted as a powerful restraint on the federal government.
It is an issue today, but with the ever-increasing complexity of our affairs,
which has exposed weaknesses in state and local government, the public
conscience has become reconciled, albeit with well-grounded apprehen-
sions, to expansions in federal authority.
What were the factors that caused this expansion in federal juris-
diction, and which influenced the change in public opinion? The federal
criminal jurisdiction, according to Professor Schwartz, "is being em-
ployed in three different ways: (1) to punish anti-social conduct of
distinctively, if not exclusively, federal concern; (2) to punish conduct
of local concern, with which local enforcement authorities are unable
or unwilling to cope; and (3) to secure compliance with federal ad-
ministrative regulations."'1 27 It was necessary first of all for the govern-
ment to protect itself against conduct that was harmful to the programs
which it was conducting. For example, as the amount of mail carried
by the government grew, it became necessary to set up criminal statutes'
aimed to prevent mail frauds and mail pilfering. But federal legislation
did not stop with matters that involved distinctive federal assignments.
As the complexity of our affairs increased and business and other
transactions extended across state lines, it became apparent, if the
public was to have protection against harmful practices associated with
some 6f these transactions, that control measures would have to be
set up by th'e Congress. 128 The expansion of this type of legislation was
126. CONBOY, Federal Criminal Law, in LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 295, 300-301
(1937).
127. Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROB. 64, 66 (1948).
128. The sanctions that were imposed are significant in still another way since they
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rapid. It involved, for example, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Emergency Price Control Act, the.
laws relating to the control of the sale of securities, the revenue laws
and so on. 12 9
The vantage of federal legislation having become apparent, there
came pressures for further expansion of federal law and into new
areas. Basically crime is a matter of local concern, but the states were
not equipped to deal with organized crime. Organized crime operates
on a national scale. Because of the impediment of jurisdictional restric-
tions, the states were helpless, and crossing from one state to another
became a refuge for the criminal. Rapid transportation added to his
facilities to play a game of hide-and-seek. It was impossible for the
states to enforce laws against prostitution when prostitutes moved
quickly from state to state; a state could not readily apprehend thieves
who could rapidly transport themselves and the stolen goods from its
jurisdiction;180 the states were relatively helpless to arrest kidnappers
so long as they were able to move themselves and their victims to
another state ;131 it was impossible for the states to control racketeering
when hoodlums could operate in a different state each successive day.132
The states were able to extradite fleeing felons, but extradition was slow
and uncertain. 133
That this situation would produce widespread public dissatisfaction
and despair was inevitable. Federal action seemed the only way to cope
with the problem, but it was not immediately apparent how the central
government could intervene, since under the Constitution its direct
jurisdiction over crimes was limited. Recourse was found by the Con-
gress through its implied powers-through the commerce clause of the
Constitution, through the postal power, and through the taxing power. 184
The significance of these developments and the forces that produced
them were not lost on the Supreme Court. "Our dual form of govern-
paved the way for the "white collar crimes," and for the enactment of various criminal
statutes that eliminated the necessity of proof of the mens rea, the "public welfare crimes."
129. MILLSPAUGH, CRIME CONTROL BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1937).
130. J. HALL, Federal 4nti-Theft Legislation, 1 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 424 (1934).
131. BOMAR, The Lindbergh Law, 1 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 435 (1934).
132. A Note on the Racketeering, Bank Robbery, and "Kick-Back" Laws, I LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 445 (1934).
133. ToY AND SHEPHERD, The Problem of Fugitive Felons and Vitnesses, I LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 415 (1934).
134. FELLMAN, Some Consequences of Increased Federal Activity in Law Enforcement,
35 3. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOL. 16, 19-20 (1944). The commerce clause has been used to
prohibit interstate shipment of the following: lottery tickets, obscene literature, adul-
terated and misbranded foods and drugs, women for immoral purposes, prize fight films,
stolen property, kidnapped persons, etc. The postal power has been used to prevent
the sending of obscene literature, lottery tickets, threatening communications, etc. The
taxing power has been extended to prohibit the sale of narcotics and firearms.
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ment," said Mr. Justice McKenna, in sustaining the validity of the
Mann Act, 1
35
has its perplexities, State and Nation having different spheres of jurisdiction, as we
have said, but it must be kept in mind that we are one people; and the powers
reserved to the States and those conferred on the Nation are adapted to be exercised,
whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material
and moral.
Whether or not these extensions are tending to unbalance our theory
of a poised system of state and national powers, and, in the light of that
theory, whether or not they are salutary is a debatable question. How-
ever that may be, it is apparent that a new and vigorous approach to
crime control has opened up. The wave of kidnapping was abated be-
cause a federal act created a presumption, if the person seized had not
been released within seven days, that he had been transported in inter-
state commerce. This statute made it possible for the F.B.I. to go into
action. Al Capone was imprisoned for violation of the revenue laws,
and federal agents were enabled to apprehend Roger Touhy, after his
escape from prison, because a federal act raised a presumption that
he had crossed state boundaries. The Kefauver Committee has recently
recommended additional measures of this type aimed to tighten criminal
law controls. 13
Beyond its immediate impact on crime problems, federal expansion of
criminal jurisdiction has had the effect of spurring "the states and local
units to increase efficiency in many phases of the administration of
criminal justice.' 3  The federal laws have tended to make the states
more alert to the jurisdictional handicaps with which they have to cope.
This has resulted in speeding up the passage of uniform state laws by
the states, and of stimulating reciprocal agreements among the states,
aimed to overcome these jurisdictional impediments. The federal
programs have also tended to increase police efficiency and to restore
public confidence in our police. Concurrent with the expansion of its
criminal jurisdiction, the federal government built up exceptionally
135. Hoke v. U.S., 227 U.S. 308, 322, 33 S.Ct. 281, 284 (1913). A history of the Mann
Act is contained in Justice McKenna's dissenting opinion in Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S.
471, 496, 37 S.Ct. 192, 199 (1917). The White Slave Traffic Act, commonly called the
Mann Act, was passed in 1910.
136. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Apr. 20, 1951, p. 26, 31; N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
1951, p. 22; HALLEY, The Kefauqer Committee, CONF. ON CRIM. LAW. ENF., U. Chi., Conf.
Series 7, p. 34 (1951). "The investigation by the Senate Committee to Investigate Crime
in Interstate Commerce was the most extensive inquiry into organized crime ever under-
taken in this country." Report, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED
CRIME, 3 (Sept. 1951). This is a report by the Commission to the Association. The
Report envisages a program involving state and federal action on organized crime and
recommends specific measures of legislation.
137. DEAN, Recent Extensions of Federal Criminal Law, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE
CRIME CONTROL, 143, 144 (1942).
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efficient investigatory and police units. As these worked side-by-side
with local police they introduced, in cooperation with local law enforce-
ment agencies, informational services dealing with modern police
methods and procedures. These contacts and programs have acted as
catalytics upon local police administrations.
38
DUE PROCESS AND THE SUPREME COURT
Ever since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment there has
been a constant flow of decisions by the Supreme Court giving scope
to and defining due process. These decisions have had a marked effect
on the criminal law and its administration. In Barron v. Baltimore, 139
decided in 1833, the Supreme Court held that the first eight amend-
ments did not impose restraint upon state action, but were limitations
only upon federal authority. With the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment a controversy was started that still is not resolved, as to
the extent to which the first eight amendments to the Constitution are
incorporated in the Fourteenth. It also marked the beginning of the
Supreme Court's role in state law enforcement. Two separate state-
ments, taken from the opinions of two of the Justices of the Supreme
Court, give perspective on this issue. "Although the Constitution puts
protection against the crime predominately in the keeping of the States,"
said Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
1 40
the Fourteenth Amendment severely restricted the States in their administration of
criminal justice. Thus, while the State courts have the responsibility for securing
the rudimentary requirements of a civilized order, in discharging that responsibility
there hangs over them the reviewing power of this Court. Power of such delicacy
and import must, of course, be exercised with the greatest forbearance. When,
however, appeal is made to it, there is no escape.
The other is by Mr. Justice Black. "The scope and operation of the
Fourteenth Amendment," he maintained,
1 41
have been fruitful sources of controversy in our constitutional history. However, in
view of its historical setting and the wrongs which called it into being, the due
process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment-just as that in the Fifth-has led
few to doubt that it was intended to guarantee procedural standards adequate and
appropriate, then and thereafter, to protect, at all times, people charged with or
suspected of crime by those holding positions of power and authority.
The freighted question is, to what extent does the reviewing power
of the Supreme Court "hang over" the state courts? Have the decisions
138. FELLMAN, Some Consequences of Increased Federal Acticvity in Law Enforcement,
35 J. CRIM. LAW AND CRIMINOL. 16, 24, 31-32 (1944).
139. 7 Pet. 243 (1833).
140. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 49-50, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 1348 (1949).
141. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235, 60 S.Ct. 472, 476 (1940).
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of the Supreme Court moved in their course so far that the guarantees
of the first eight amendments, first erected against "those in positions
of power and authority" in the federal orbit, are now also guarantees
against those in positions of power and authority iri the state orbit?
This is difficult to answer. It would appear, though, while the line
bounding the area of restraints on state action is wavering, that the
two areas, federal and state, are today nearly conterminous. Mr. Justice
Cardozo has reasoned ably that the due process provision does not
embrace all of the first eight amendments, but only those liberties that
are "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty, 14 2 which to
abolish or deny would be to violate a "principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental.' 14 3 In the Palko case he enumerated much of what he thought
was implicit in the "scheme of ordered liberty." That opinion was
written in 1937. The position of the Supreme Court, as more recently
defined, is that there are no set lines; that what the due process pro-
vision encompasses must vary as our conceptions of what is right
change. In Wolf v. Colorado,144 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, while stress-
ing that the Court has rejected the notion that " 'due process of law'
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is shorthand for the first
eight amendments," went on to say that due process of law "conveys
neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements," and that it is "of
the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what
is deemed reasonable and right." Representing as it does a living
principle, he emphasized, "due process is not confined within a perma-
nent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed the limits or
the essentials of fundamental rights.' u4 5
142. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152 (1937).
143. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332 (1934).
144. 338 U.S. 25, 26-27, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1360-1361 (1949).
145. An analysis of the application of the due process provision to each of the first
eight amendments would involve extensive treatment that cannot be covered in this article.
The following are some of the more important decisions of the Supreme Court bearing
on this subject. Searches and Seizures: Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524 (1886);
Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914), the Weeks case had a profound effect
on decisions by state courts; Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928), holding
wire-tapping not illegal search; Oklahoma Press PubI. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66
S.Ct. 494 (1946); Shapiro v. U.S., 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375 (1948); U.S. v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430 (1950), search incident to arrest; Nardone v. U.S., 302 U.S. 379,
58 S.Ct. 275 (1937), wire-tapping illegal under communications act; PLUMB, Illegal
Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORN. L. Q. 337 (1939); WAITE, Police Regulation by Rules
of Evidence, 42 MicH. L. REV. 679 (1944). Self-Incrimination: Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S.
616, 6 S.Ct. 524 (1886) ; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 S.Ct. 195 (1892);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908); ComwiN, The Supreme Court's
Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MicH. L. REv. 1, 191 (1930). Confessions:
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227, 60 S.Ct. 472 (1940) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 64 S. Ct. 921 (1944), 36 hours
of interrogation "inherently coercive"; McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1943),
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There is a variance in views as to the import of this development.
Concern has been expressed that the restraints imposed by the Supreme
Court have resulted, not in the improvement of the procedures and
methods of the police, but in more serious police misbehavior. Appre-
hensions over the trend of the Court's decisions have been expressed
not only by law enforcement officers, but, in dissenting opinions, by
some of the justices of the Court. What is, perhaps, a more significant
misgiving relates to the effectiveness of the impact of the decisions on
law administration. Are the holdings of the Court in reality a deterrent
on actions of over-zealous officers? Do they tend to create better
police methods and behavior? The doubt centers in the fact that of the
great number of criminal cases, only on rare occasions is one appealed
to the Supreme or even to an appellate court. This argument actually
brings into review the effectiveness of all appellate procedure. It has
some merit. Even so, what is the alternative? Is the Bill of Rights
to be ignored as meaningless, or at best, to be regarded as a mere
collection of pious expressions? If the Bill of Rights is to have meaning
and substance in our scheme of government, its guarantees must be made
to speak with authority. The decisions of the Supreme Court give
them vitality, and the weight of these decisions is felt. It may be
debatable whether the first eight amendments should be made restraints
on state agencies by the indirect route of the due process provision.
But are we not one people? And if the amendments are a bulwark
against the misuse of federal power, then should they not also be a
bulwark against the misuse of power, whatever its source ?146
THE WAR-CRIME TRIALS
In many respects the war-crime trials have constituted, at least in the
aims that prompted them and in their potentials, the most significant
development in the criminal law during the last century. World War II,
if an accused who has made a confession was not taken promptly before a magistrate
the confession is not admissible; Upshaw v. U.S., 335 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 170 (1948) ; INDAU,
The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. Rav. 442 (1948) ;
DassioN, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 55 YALE L. J. 694, 712 (1946).
Habeas Corpus and Post-Convuiction Hearing: Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 69 S.Ct. 1073
(1949) ; JENNER, The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 9 Fed. R. D. 347 (1949). Right
to Counsel: Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932); Betts v. Brady; 316 U.S.
455, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 68 S.Ct. 240 (1947). Right
to Public Trial: In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499 (1948). Jury Trial and Equal
Protection: Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579 (1935) ; Fay v. New York, 332
U.S. 261, 67 S.Ct. 1613 (1947). Confrontation: In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499
(1948) ; Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079 (1949). A helpful list of
constitutional limitations may be found in ORFIELD, What Constitutes Fair Criminal Pro-
cedure under Municipal and International Law, 12 U. PIrBUrRcH L. Rav. 35 (1950).
146. BOSKEY AND PICKERING, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure, 13 U.
CH. L. REv. 266, 298 (1946).
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which in scope, ferocity and in its implications for humanity had sur-
passed all other wars in history, had been brought to a successful con-
clusion by the Allied Powers. Now came the reactions and the expres-
sions of convictions from thinking people about war. Leaders in the
field of international relations had long advocated the establishment
of measures that would tend to restrain nations from going to war,
and, over the years, various steps had been taken, aimed to reduce the
causes of war. Now high-minded men everywhere sought a formula
which would make impossible a recurrence of a holocaust such as the
peoples of the world had just endured. Among the measures proposed
was that the major war criminals be tried and punished. On August 8,
1945, an agreement, commonly called the London Agreement, was
signed by the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union,
to which nineteen other nations later adhered, which set up an Inter-
national Military Tribunal to conduct these trials. This Agreement, said
Mr. Justice Jackson, "marks a transition in international law. * * *
Three broad categories of acts," he went on to say,
are defined as criminal in this code. The first, crimes against peace, consists of
planning, preparing, initiating or waging a war of aggression or a war in violation
of international undertakings, or participating in a common plan or conspiracy to
accomplish any of the foregoing acts. The second category, war crimes, embraces
violations of the laws and customs of land and sea warfare, including plunder,
wanton destruction, and all forms of mistreatment of inhabitants of occupied terri-
tories and prisoners of war. The third class of offenses, crimes against humanity,
consists of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecu-
tions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with
crimes against peace or war crimes, whether or not in violation of domestic law
of the country where perpetrated. * * * The charter also enacts the principle that
individuals rather than states are responsible for criminal violations of international
law and applies to such lawbreakers the principle of conspiracy by which one who
joins in a common plan to commit crime becomes responsible for the acts of any
other conspirator in executing the plan. In prohibiting the plea of "acts of state"
as freeing defendants from legal responsibility, the charter refuses to recognize the
immunity once enjoyed by criminal statesmanship. Finally, the charter provides
that orders of a superior authority shall not free a defendant from responsibility,
though they may be considered in mitigation of punishment if justice so requires.' 4 7
Under the authority of this Agreement a number of "war crimi-
nals" have been tried, convicted and sentenced. The most famous of
the trials, the Nuremberg Trial, began on November 20, 1945, and
ended on October 1, 1946. It resulted in the sentencing of twelve
of the defendants to death by hanging; seven defendants were given
prison sentences ranging from ten years to life, and three were acquitted.




"The judgment," in the opinion of Quincy Wright,
gives precison to the principles of international law which have been developed
during the past generation in the effort to "outlaw war." The meaning of "aggres-
sive war," both as an international delinquency and as an individual criminal offense,
and the international law concerning superior orders, acts of state, criminal con-
spiracy and criminal organization were clarified.1 48
There are high hopes relative to this development. There also
are gloomy apprehensions. "The verdict of history will not be rendered
for a long time. ' 149 What emerges for the purpose of this discussion
is that we are dealing with a new concept of crime-one arising from
instituting a war. We are particularly concerned with the principle
announced in the London Agreement that individuals "rather than states
are responsible for criminal violations of international law." Sheldon
Glueck finds precedent for this law in the Briand-Kellogg Pact of
1928.150 Others insist that it was first made a crime through the
London Agreement.' 51 If it came into being with the London Agree-
ment in 1945, the objection based on its being an ex post facto law, as
applied to acts done before 1945, has some validity. The rule against
retroactive legislation is well-grounded in national law, and definitely in
Anglo-American law. However, it is not valid in international law.
The more weighty criticisms relate to the fact that the International
Military Tribunal, which tried the defendants in the Nuremberg Trial,
was composed exclusively of representatives of the victorious states;
that the London Agreement establishes a principle of individual respon-
sibility for war crimes under a sweeping provision which recognizes
the doctrine of "guilt by association;" and that the program projected
is one of retrogression in the criminal law because of the stress laid
on the retributive and deterrent theories of punishment.
Apprehensions are being expressed that through the London Agree-
ment the signatory powers may have created a Frankenstein. Kelsen
points out that the tribunal set up by the Agreement not only excluded
representatives of the vanquished states but those of neutral states as
well. The bench was composed exclusively of representatives of the
victorious states. We should remember that the right does not always
prevail in war. What is more, one of the states, whose representatives
148. The Nuernberg Trial, 37 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOL. 477, 478 (1947); PARKER,
The Nuernberg Trial, 30 J. AM. J. Soc. 109 (1946); RADIN, International Crimes, 32
IOWA L. REv. 33 (1946).
149. WECIISLER, The Issues of the Nuremberg Trial, 62 POL. Sc. Q. 11 (1947).
150. THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND AGGRESSIVE WAR, 14-45 (1946).
151. ScHicK, International Criminal Lauc-Facts and Illusions, 11 MODERN L. REV. 290
(1948); KELSEN, Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in
International Lav?, 1 INT. L. Q. 153, 155-161 (1947).
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were judges and prosecutors at the Trial, had shared with Germany
the booty of the war waged against Poland, a war which was declared
by the Tribunal that tried the defendants to have been a war against
peace. "If the principles applied in the Nuremberg trial were to become
a precedent-a legislative rather than a judicial precedent," Kelsen
concludes,
then, after the next war, the govenments of the victorious States would try the
members of the governments of the vanquished States for having committed crimes
determined unilaterally and with retroactive force by the former. Let us hope that
there is no such precedent.' 52
The London Agreement established the meritorious principle of
individual responsibility for violations of international law. But it did
not stop there. It put into force the doctrine that an individual can be
found guilty, not because he had the mens rea to commit a crime-not,
indeed, because he had committed p. crime-but because he belonged
to an association that had been declared to be criminal. This means
collective responsibility; it means guilt by association. Mr. Justice
Douglas has made a clear presentation of the implications of this
doctrine in his concurring opinion in the case of Anti-Fascist Committee
v. McGrath.'-3 In discussing the issues of that case he said':
The technique is one of guilt by association--one of the most odious institutions
of history. The fact that the technique of guilt by association was used in the
prosecutions at Nuremberg does not make it 'congenial to our constitutional scheme.
Guilt under our system of government is personal. When we make guilt vicarious
we borrow from systems alien to ours and ape our enemies. Those short-cuts
may at times seem to serve noble aims; but we depreciate ourselves by indulging
in them. When we deny even the most degraded person the rudiments of a fair
trial, we endanger the liberties of everyone. We set a pattern of conduct that is
dangerously expansive and is adaptable to the needs of any majority bent on
suppressing opposition or dissension.
The sanctions established in the London Agreement are also open
to question. They emphasize the retributive and deterrent theories
of punishment. It may well be, in this area, that no other avenues
were open. Notwithstanding, the point must be stressed that if the
long years of experience with criminal punishment, from primitive to
present-day law, have established any firm conviction, it is that retribu-
tive punishment is irrational and futile. Less irrational and futile,
but nevertheless- open to serious question, is the theory that punish-
ment will deter the wrong-doer. It is doubtful whether the sanctions
set up in the Agreement will have a deterrent effect on those who plan
152. Op. cit., 170-171. For a more recent statement bearing on the status of the charter
and judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, see, YUEN-LI LIANG, Notes on Legal Questions
Concerning the United Nations, 45 AM. J. INT. LAW 509 (1951).
153. 341 U.S. 123, 178-179, 71 S.Ct. 624, 652 (1951).
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wars. "One should not forget, in this connection, that wars are planned
and commenced in the hope of victory, and not in fear of possible
defeat."'154
What is the import of this development? We are at present too
involved in a clash of views over the implications of a new legal concept
to make any reliable appraisal of it. That will have to await the verdict
of the future. We should recognize that the misgivings expressed as
to some phases of the London Agreement have merit. If there are
defects in that Agreement, they should be remedied as soon as possible.
Definitely, risks were taken when the program was initiated. From a
wider perspective, however, the view is majestic. The new charter has
given recognition to the principle that the behavior of individuals in
relation to acts of war is subject to control by law. With the approval
of that principle, a new and potent factor, aimed to restrain aggressive
war and inhumane acts associated with war, has been introduced into
the domain of international law.
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
The reflective observer who seeks perspective on the criminal law
as an instrument for social control must be struck with the realization
that he is viewing a vast area that is ruled by traditional but untested
assumptions and administered through numerous uncoordinated regula-
tions and practices. A major criticism of the criminal law is that it
lacks a unity of aim.' This comment could, of course, be made about
most of our social institutions. It is particularly valid when applied
to the criminal law. The source of greatest public discontent with the
criminal law is its administration. Interestingly enough, however, much
of the progress that has been made in this general area has been in
administration. The difficulty has been that administrative reforms have
not been in accord with the basic assumptions of the law.
The criminal law is saturated with concepts that should be appraised
-that should be re-evaluated in the light of present-day knowledge and
understanding. It is founded on the doctrine of good and evil-on the
doctrine that the individual is a free moral agent. It assumes that
conduct can be measured and that human behavior can be controlled
through the assessment of homeopathic penalties. In this scheme of
things punishment becomes an end. Punishment is the bite noire of
154. SCHICK, International Criminal Law-Facts and Illusions, 11 MODERN L. REv. 290,
299 (1948).
155. GLtuEcK, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARV. L. REv. 453 (1928) ;
GAUsEwITz, Considerations Basic to a New Penal Code, 11 Wis. L. REV. 346, 480 (1936) ;
HARNO, Rationale of a Criminal Code, 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 549 (1937).
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the criminal law. It should not be ignored; it has a place in this scheme
but only as a part of a pattern of social control. The behavior sciences
stress treatment of offenders and some salutary moves involving such
measures as probation, parole, the establishment of juvenile courts, the
introduction of prison reforms, etc., have been initiated under their
stimulation. But these ineasures are restricted in their development
because of conditions that are imposed when penalties against offenders
are assessed. What is needed is that punishment and treatment be
coordinated.
In most of our states there is a great mass of discordant judge-made
law and legislation touching crimes. These materials ,are not con-
sistent as to what behavior should be made criminal. The severity of
penalties as to separate crimes is uneven and often irrational. Many
acts that are declared criminal would, in a rational scheme, give rise
to no more than civil actions. Legislation relative to crimes often is
overly verbose and detailed in its definitions and specifications. The
result is that discretionary action on the part of judges and administra-
tive agencies is unduly restricted and flexibility in the treatment of
offenders is limited. It is, of course, essential that the definitions of
crimes be clear and certain, but beyond that, much weight should be
given to judicial discretion and to the need for the after-conviction
treatment of offenders.
That there has been evolution in the criminal law and its adminis-
tration in the last century cannot be doubted. The crime problem has
not been solved; it never will be. Some of the changes that have been
brought about are questionable. The total picture, however, is one of
substantial progress. Progress has been made toward the simplification
and liberalization of criminal procedure, in the understanding of human
beings and their behavior which has softened the harshness of the law,
and in the acceptance of the findings, of research. The findings of
research, to an increasing extent, are guiding the policy of legislation
and the actions of judges, prosecuting officers and administrative agen-
cies. We are passing from a long era of a priori assumptions in the
criminal law to one in which the premises of the law are founded in
research. The transition is gradual and is accompanied with great
travail, but its direction is unmistakable.
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